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A stable money demand: Looking for the right
monetary aggregate
Introduction and summary
The stability of a money demand relationship has
been a major concern in monetary economics for the
last 50 years. It is conventional to call the relationship
between real money, a nominal interest rate, and a
measure of economic activity a money demand rela-
tionship. A stable relationship between these variables
helps answer important questions such as the follow-
ing: What is the average growth rate of money that
is consistent with price stability, given the average
growth of the economy and a stable nominal interest
rate? Knowledge about the response of money demand
to changes in the nominal interest rate may also help
quantify the welfare gains from a low average infla-
tion rate.
In an essay in honor of Allan Meltzer, Lucas
(1988) reassesses the evidence on the stability of the
money demand estimated by Meltzer (1963) and
justifies that stability not only on empirical grounds
but also on theoretical ones. He shows that there is a
theoretical equilibrium relationship between real money,
a nominal interest rate as a measure of the opportuni-
ty cost of money, and gross domestic product (GDP)
as a measure of transactions that is not exactly a money
demand, but that is indeed stable. He estimates that
equilibrium relationship using the monetary aggregate
M1 as the measure of money with data up to 1985
and argues that there is a stable relationship between
those variables with a unitary income elasticity and
with a strong negative response of real balances to
the nominal interest rate (see box 1 for definitions of
the different monetary aggregates).
The relationship estimated by Lucas (1988) holds
very well until the mid-1980s but not well at all after
that. This could be because the demand for money is
not a stable relationship after all, contrary to what
the simple model would suggest. Another conclusion,
which is our view, is that the measure of money is
not a stable measure. In particular, we argue that
technological innovation and changes in regulatory
practices in the past two decades have made other mon-
etary aggregates as liquid as M1, so that the measure
of money should be adjusted accordingly. We show
that once a more appropriate measure of money is
taken into consideration, the stability of money de-
mand is recovered.
Banking deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s
and financial innovation in the 1990s associated with
the development of electronic payments indeed sug-
gest we need to reconsider the measure of transactions
demand for money. Until the end of the 1970s, the
transactions demand for money was well approximat-
ed by M1. Since then, however, a series of sweeping
regulatory reforms and technological developments
in the banking sector have significantly changed the
way banks operate and the way people use banking
services and conduct transactions. First, the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 abolished most of the interest rate ceilings
that had been imposed on deposit accounts since the
Banking Act of 1933 and authorized nationwide ne-
gotiable orders of withdrawal accounts (NOWs),
which are interest-bearing checking accounts classi-
fied in M1. Furthermore, the Garn–St Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982 authorized money
market deposit accounts (MMDAs), interest-bearing
savings accounts that can be used for transactions
with some restrictions. MMDAs are classified in M251 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
BOX 1
Monetary aggregates
M1: Currency held by the public
+ Travelers checks
+ Demand deposits
+ Other checkable deposits, including
NOWs (negotiable orders of withdrawal
accounts), ATS (automatic transfer
services), and share draft account
balances.
M2: M1
+ Savings deposits, including MMDAs
(money market deposit accounts)
+ Small-denomination time deposits
+ Retail money market mutual funds
M3: M2
+ Institutional MMMFs (money market
mutual funds)
+ Large-denomination time deposits
+ Repurchase agreements
+ Eurodollars
MZM (Money zero maturity): M2
– Small-denomination time deposits
+ Institutional MMMFs
Note: The basic framework for these definitions was
adopted in 1980.
(see box 1). These two major banking reforms
blurred the traditional distinction between the mone-
tary aggregates M1 and M2 in their transactions and
savings roles. Second, the rapid development of elec-
tronic payments technology and, in particular, the
growing use of credit cards and the automated clear-
inghouse (ACH) as means of payment, reinforced the
effect of the banking reforms in slowing down the
growth of M1. Both credit cards and ACH transac-
tions can be settled with MMDAs and, therefore,
with M2 rather than M1. Third, the widespread adop-
tion of retail sweep programs (discussed in detail lat-
er) by depository institutions since 1994, which
reclassify checking account deposits as saving depos-
its overnight, reduced the balances that were classi-
fied in M1 by almost half.
These fundamental changes in the regulatory en-
vironment and the transactions technology justify the
use of a different measure of money after 1980. The
measure MZM (money zero maturity) includes bal-
ances that can be used for transactions immediately
at zero cost and was initially proposed by Motley (1988)
and Poole (1991) as a more appropriate measure of
the transactions demand for money (see box 1). We
show that changing the monetary aggregate measure
from M1 to MZM from 1980 onward preserves the
long-run relationship between real money, the oppor-
tunity cost of money, and economic activity up to a
constant factor.
In the next section, we show evidence of the dif-
ficulty in explaining the behavior of M1 with the be-
havior of GDP and the nominal interest rate. Then,
we discuss why MZM, rather than M1, is an appropri-
ate measure of the transactions demand for money in
the past two decades. Finally, we estimate a money
demand equation derived from a simple transaction
technology model, using M1 as the monetary aggre-
gate before 1980 and MZM after 1980 and obtain
evidence in support of the stability of money demand.
An unstable demand for M1
Figures 1 and 2 reproduce figures 1 and 4 in
Lucas (2000), extending the data through 2003.1
Figure 1 suggests that, over the course of the past cen-
tury, movements in the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP
have been inversely related to movements in the short-
term nominal interest rate. Following Meltzer (1963),
Lucas (1988) uses data up to 1985 to estimate a money
demand equation, using M1 as the measure of money
and a short-term nominal interest rate as the measure
for the opportunity cost of money, and confirms
Meltzer’s result that the income elasticity is about
1.0 and the interest elasticity is high.2 Lucas (1988)
reports an interest rate semi-elasticity between 0.05
and 0.1, which for an interest rate of 4 percent corre-
sponds to an interest elasticity between 0.2 and 0.4.
Using data from 1900 through 1994, Lucas (2000)
reports an interest elasticity of 0.5, consistent with a
shopping time3 model for money demand. The mon-









where Mt is the monetary aggregate measured by M1,
Pt is the price level, Yt denotes the aggregate output
level, it is the short-term nominal interest rate, and
the interest elasticity is γ  = 0.5, while α  is a constant
term. Real money responds to output with a unitary
elasticity and negatively to the nominal interest rate
with a relatively large elasticity, so that in response
to a 1 percent increase in the nominal interest rate,52 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
the real money demand declines by 0.5 percent. Out-
put is a measure of transactions, and people demand
more money when the volume of transactions is high-
er. The unitary income elasticity is consistent with
real money growing at the same average rate as out-
put. The negative response of the demand for money
to the nominal interest rate makes sense because the
short-term nominal interest rate is the
foregone return from holding non-inter-
est-bearing, but liquid, money balances.
Figure 2 plots the actual and estimat-
ed real balances using the money demand
equation above with an interest elasticity
γ  = 0.5. Clearly, one would expect a larg-
er reaction of real balances to the lower
interest rates in the 1980s and 1990s. A
lower elasticity of 0.32, instead of 0.5,
would still not get close to being consis-
tent with the actual low growth in M1.
This is apparent from figure 3, where we
plot the logarithm of the ratio of M1 to
nominal GDP against the logarithm of
the nominal interest rate for the period
1900–2003. Figure 3 indicates that there
could be a different money demand rela-
tionship for each of the three periods
1900–79, 1980–94, and 1995–2003. The
solid line corresponds to the estimated
elasticity of 0.32 for the entire 1900–
2003 period. The interest elasticity for
the three subperiods would be 0.26,
0.12, and –0.07, respectively, so that the
response to the interest rate movements
over time would be less and less pro-
nounced. The constant term also changes
across the three periods, corresponding to
the increased inability to explain the low
growth in M1 with movements in econom-
ic activity and the nominal interest rate.
Ball (2001) argues that the data after
1987 represent evidence against a stable
money demand. He estimates a linear re-
lationship between the logarithm of real
money, the logarithm of output, and a
nominal interest rate for subperiods of
1903–94. For the period 1903–87 the
evidence is consistent with a stable rela-
tionship with a unitary income elasticity
and a relatively high interest elasticity,
as shown by Lucas (1988) and Stock and
Watson (1993). However, the need to
account for the low reaction of M1 to
lower interest rates and higher output af-
ter 1980 lowers both the estimated interest elasticity
and income elasticity. The relatively low income and
interest elasticity in the postwar period (1947–94) are
significantly different from the unitary income elas-
ticity and relatively high interest elasticity in the pre-
war period (1903–45), leading Ball to argue against a
stable long run money demand.4
FIGURE 1
M1/nominal GDP and the nominal interest rate,
1900–2003
M1/nominal GDP




















Actual and estimated real balances M1/P, 1900–2003
(interest elasticity of 0.5)
billions of 2000 dollars
Notes: Restricting the interest elasticity to be .5, the estimated real balances
 are  −  = 






Source: Authors’ calculations and Lucas (2000).
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Measuring money used for transactions
In this section, we argue that M1 was a good
measure of money used for transactions before major
developments in banking regulation and financial in-
novation starting in the early 1980s. Since then, a
measure such as MZM has become more appropriate.
Figure 4 (p. 54) shows the trend growth of all
four monetary aggregates: M1, M2, M3, and MZM
since 1959 (data for MZM are available since 1974).
In particular, since 1980, M1 has grown at a low rate
(5.1 percent) and flattened after 1994. In contrast, av-
erage MZM growth has been 9 percent since 1980.
The rapid expansion in MZM is evident in the figure;
its value surpassed that of M2 in 2001.
Before 1980, M1, consisting of currency, non-in-
terest-bearing demand deposits, and a very small
amount of interest-bearing checkable deposits (see
figure 5 (p. 54) and discussion in the next section)
was the primary transaction monetary aggregate. The
main components of M2, other than M1, were sav-
ings deposits, mostly passbook savings accounts on
which checks could not be written, and small time
deposits. Neither could be directly used for transac-
tions. The other component of M2, retail money mar-
ket mutual funds (MMMFs), a nonbank financial
instrument (some have restricted check-writing ca-
pacity) developed in the mid-1970s and remained
very small, as shown in figure 5. Therefore, there
was a clear distinction between M1 and the compo-
nents of M2 other than M1 before 1980. The former
could be used for transactions at zero cost and did
not bear interest, while the latter were interest-bear-
ing instruments that could not be directly used for
transactions. Since then, this distinction has become
FIGURE 3
M1/nominal GDP and nominal interest rate, 1900–2003
In (M1/nominal GDP)
Notes: Estimated 1900–2003:   =− − 






Estimated 1900–79:   =− − 
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Estimated 1980–94:   =− − 
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less clear-cut. Three major developments in banking
regulation and financial innovation are responsible
for the change.
Financial innovation and regulatory reform
since 1980
Banking deregulation
The banking deregulation that ensued in the late
1970s and early 1980s changed the banking industry
landscape from a highly regulated one into a fairly com-
petitive one. An unavoidable consequence of the de-
regulation was the blurring of the various components
of M1 and M2 as transaction/saving instruments.
The reform started in the 1970s
when many commercial banks and de-
pository institutions were struggling to
survive in the high inflation, high interest
rate environment, with their hands tied
by many regulations, in particular, Feder-
al Reserve Regulation Q. This regulation
prohibited interest payment on demand
deposits and imposed interest-rate ceil-
ings on time and savings deposits. The
first move toward deregulation was the
authorization granted by several north-
eastern states to state-chartered mutual
saving banks, and later other depository
institutions, to offer NOWs, an interest-
bearing transaction account.5 Other prod-
ucts or services designed to provide
consumers with more efficient cash man-
agement tools developed at the same
time. For example, commercial banks
and thrifts were able to provide prear-
ranged automatic transfer services (ATS)
from consumers’ savings accounts to
their checking accounts, customers could
transfer their savings balances to check-
ing remotely, and federally chartered
credit unions were allowed to issue share
drafts. These innovations were officially
sanctioned by the Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
in 1980. More specifically, the act elimi-
nated most of the interest rate ceilings on
time deposits and savings accounts and
authorized the use of checkable NOW
accounts and other interest-bearing ac-
counts (such as ATS and share draft ac-
counts at credit unions) by individuals
and non-profit organizations. The privi-
lege was extended to all levels of govern-
ment agencies in 1982. The only exception
is demand deposits of corporations, on which the
1933 prohibition of interest payment remains in effect
today.6 These regulatory changes allowed depository
institutions to compete more effectively for funds;
they also removed the impediments for depositors to
earn the market rate of return on their transaction
balances. The direct consequence of the act is the
prevalent use of interest-bearing checking accounts.
A second major regulatory banking reform was
the Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982. It authorized the creation of money market
deposit accounts (MMDAs) to compete with
















Other checkable deposits and MMMFs, 1969–2003
billions of dollars
Note: Data used to plot this graph are in quarterly frequency.
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is an interest-bearing account that carries no reserve
requirements. The account offers limited transaction
capacity: no more than six withdrawals by check or
pre-authorized transfer per month, but no limit on de-
posits or number of withdrawals from an ATM, by mail,
or at a branch. This act led to a substantial increase in
the use of checkable savings accounts for transactions.
The deregulatory measures of the early 1980s,
allowing for interest payments on checking accounts
and checking privileges on savings accounts, blurred
the distinction between transaction and saving depos-
its, consequently blurring the distinction between M1
and M2.
Electronic payments
Following the banking deregulation in the
1980s, the rapid development of electronic payments
in the 1990s also fostered the use of components of
broader monetary aggregates for transaction purposes.
Credit cards are particularly responsible for this.
Credit cards are often used as a substitute for
cash, check, and debit card transactions. Monthly
balances on a credit card can be paid with an auto-
mated clearing house (ACH) transaction or a check
written on a checking account or checkable savings
account.7 The fact that there is a single payment at a
certain date reduces the need to maintain high daily
balances in checking accounts to meet the uncertain
sequence of transaction and payment flows. This re-
duction is reinforced by the fact that it is possible to
use checkable savings accounts to pay for credit card
balances. The total number of credit and debit card
transactions almost tripled in 1990s, from 10.8 bil-
lion in 1990 to 30 billion in 2000 (Humphrey, 2002).
The ACH is another important de-
velopment in electronic payments. ACH
is a nationwide mechanism that process-
es electronically originated batches of
credit and debit transfers. ACH credit
transfers include direct deposit payroll
payments and payments to contractors
and vendors. ACH debit transfers include
consumer payments on insurance premi-
ums, mortgage loans, and other kinds of
bills. This form of electronic bill pay-
ment is a substitute for checks. A share
of these transactions is from checkable
savings accounts, classified in M2, in-
stead of from checking accounts. The
Federal Reserve Banks operate the na-
tion’s largest ACH operation, which in
2000 processed more than 80 percent of
commercial interbank ACH transactions.
In 1991, the Federal Reserve processed 1,119 million
commercial (not including government) ACH trans-
actions (valued at $5,549 billion), while in 2003
the number jumped to 5,588 million transactions
($13,952 billion), an annual increase of 14.3 percent
in volume (8 percent in value).
Retail sweep programs
A third important development leading to the
confounding roles of M1 and M2 for transactions
and savings was the adoption of retail sweep pro-
grams that reclassify checking account deposits as
savings deposits overnight. Since 1994, commercial
banks have started using deposit-sweeping software
to dynamically reclassify the balances in checking
accounts above a certain level as MMDAs and to re-
classify them back when the balances on the check-
ing accounts are too low. By adopting the practice,
depository institutions avoid reserve requirements on
the reclassified portion of the checking account (the
reserve requirement on demand deposits, ATS,
NOW, and other checkable deposits can be as high as
10 percent, depending on the size of the institution).
The software effectively creates a shadow MMDA
for every checking account, based on the customer’s
payment patterns, subject to the constraint that the
number of “transfers” (reclassifications) from an
MMDA to a checking account does not exceed six
each month. The shadow account is included in M2,
but not in M1.
More and more banks are adopting the retail
sweep programs. As indicated by figure 6,8 the total
amount of sweeps of transaction deposits into MMDAs
has been rising steadily since 1994, from zero to an
FIGURE 6
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FIGURE 7
M1/nominal GDP (1900–79), MZM/nominal GDP (1980–2003), and the opportunity cost
In (M/nominal GDP)
Notes: Estimated 1900–79:   =− − 
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Estimated 1980–2003:  ()
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amount nearly equal to transaction deposits in M1.
According to the Federal Reserve Board’s estimates,
as of December 2003, the sweeps of transaction de-
posits into MMDAs were approximately $575.5 bil-
lion, while total transaction deposits in published M1
were $621.3 billion. The widespread use of retail
sweep programs substantially affected the growth of
M1. The nominal value of M1 has been almost flat
since 1994.
MZM as a better measure of transaction
balances since 1980
As a result of the financial innovations and regu-
latory reforms since 1980, components of the “trans-
actions” aggregate M1 bear interest, and components
of the “savings” aggregate M2 are used for transac-
tions. These changes call for a reconsideration of the
measure of transactions demand for money and its
opportunity cost. More specifically, if there is to be a
stable, long-run relationship between real money, its
opportunity cost, and transactions, a different mea-
sure of money and its opportunity cost may be neces-
sary to sustain the relationship.
Motley (1988) and Poole (1991) argue that the
present classification of monetary aggregates (M1,
M2, M3) is inherently arbitrary, in particular in light
of the banking industry developments discussed above.
They believe that the important distinction should be
whether the deposit has a specified term to maturity.
For example, NOW accounts in M1 and MMDAs in
M2 are nonterm deposits, but small and large denom-
ination time deposits in M2 and M3 are term assets.
Nonterm deposits can be readily converted into
transaction balances, or in other words, are fully liq-
uid. On the other hand, term deposits that have to be
liquidated before maturity incur the cost of an early
withdrawal penalty. In an environment free of govern-
ment regulation, and within the limits of technology57 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
constraints, agents’ portfolio decisions de-
pend on their liquidity preferences and the
return on the assets. The term/nonterm
distinction of monetary aggregates is
aligned with private agents’ incentives.
Motley proposed classifying all non-
term deposits, money that can be accessed
without notice and at par, as a new mone-
tary aggregate. Poole coined the name
MZM (money zero maturity) for the mea-
sure. Specifically, MZM is defined as
MZM = M2 – Small denomination time
deposits + Institutional MMMFs.
Institutional MMMFs, currently clas-
sified in M3, are interest-bearing check-
able accounts that allow holders to get
around the zero-interest demand deposits
restriction.
The demand for money
In appendix 1, we show that it is pos-
sible to derive from a simple stochastic











which is a variant of equation 1 that accounts for the
fact that money may earn interest. This is an exact
equilibrium relationship of observable economic
variables. As pointed out in Lucas (2000), this is rea-
son to think that the empirical analog to that relation-
ship, which will have to account for measurement
error, is a stable relationship. The equilibrium relation-
ship in equation 2 is not exactly a money demand
function, computed from the decision by households
on how much money to hold, given economic variables
out of their control, namely the prices of goods and
assets and endowments. It does, however, look like the
money demand functions that are commonly estimated.
In this section, we estimate the empirical coun-
terpart of the money demand equation above using
ordinary least squares (OLS). First, like Lucas (1988,
2000), we use M1 as the measure of money and a short-
term nominal interest rate as its opportunity cost. As
mentioned before, the estimated interest elasticity is
0.32, lower than the 0.5 reported by Lucas (2000) for
the period 1900–94. If we estimate the elasticity for
three subperiods, 1900–79, 1980–94, and 1995–
2003, the interest elasticities are lower, 0.26, 0.12,
FIGURE 8
Actual and estimated real balances, M1/P (1900–79)
and MZM/P (1980–2003)
(common interest elasticity of 0.24)
billions of 2000 dollars
Notes: Estimated 1900–79:  −  = 

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–0.07, respectively. It would also be apparent that the
curves would be shifted down.
Next, we estimate equation 2 using M1 as the
measure of money for the period 1900–79 and MZM
for the period 1980–2003. Because components of
M1 bore no interest before 1980 (mostly cash and
demand deposits) and components of MZM are inter-
est-bearing after 1980 (NOWs, MMDAs, MMMFs),
we assume that   0
m
t i = before 1980 and we set 
m
t i to
MZM’s own rate after 1980. MZM’s own rate is a
weighted average of the returns on the different com-
ponents of MZM.9 We allow different intercepts for
the two periods, because it is not reasonable to impose
the coincidence of the two series, M1 and MZM, in
1980, but we do impose a common interest elasticity.
The estimated money demand equation is as follows,
1900–79:  1 ˆ



















=− − − 

If we allowed for separate interest elasticity for
the two periods in the regression, the two elasticities
would be 0.26 and 0.2, respectively, for the first and
second periods.1058 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
Figure 7 plots the logarithm of M1/nominal GDP
for the period 1900–79 and that of MZM/nominal
GDP for the subsequent period 1980–2003 against
the logarithm of the opportunity cost of using these
balances, along with the linear regression lines. The
roughly common elasticity across the two periods
suggests that the response of the money aggregate to
changes in its opportunity cost, in percentage terms,
has remained stable over the last century, as long as
one uses the appropriate definition of monetary ag-
gregate and its opportunity cost. The upward shift of
the function (smaller intercept) reflects the fact that
MZM and M1 include different liquid assets, even if
all are zero maturity. In figure 8, we plot the actual
and estimated real money demand using M1 for the
period 1900–79 and MZM for the period following
the deregulation and financial innovation.
Conclusion
While real M1 has increased very little in the
last quarter century, nominal interest rates have come
down considerably. If the interest elasticity were the
one reported by Lucas (2000), we would expect a
substantial increase in M1 that did not occur. This
could indicate that the money demand relationship
estimated by Meltzer (1963) and Lucas (1988), among
many others, is not a stable equilibrium relationship.
Instead, we argue that M1 is not the appropriate mea-
sure of money, following the regulatory reforms and
innovation in electronic payments since the early 1980s.
If we use an alternative, more appropriate measure of
money, that is, MZM or money zero maturity, the long-
run relationship between money and its opportunity
cost is preserved. We estimate the interest elasticity
to be 0.24, so that a 1 percent increase in the oppor-
tunity cost of holding money induces a 0.24 percent
decline in real money balances.
Why do we care about estimating a stable money
demand at the cost of an unstable measure of money?
In addition to the theoretical interest of this issue, there
is also a practical aspect to it. It is a worthy objective
of a monetary authority to provide elastic11 liquidity
at stable prices. A stable estimate of money demand,
whatever the appropriate monetary aggregate might
be, is an important tool in performing this task.59 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
NOTES
1To be able to make comparisons, we use the same data as Lucas
(2000) for relevant data analysis and figures. In particular, M1,
real GDP, the price deflator, and the nominal interest rate are con-
structed, as in Lucas (2000), from different data sources for dif-
ferent periods. See the appendix for a detailed description of the
data used in this article.
2The income and interest elasticities measure the percentage in-
crease in real money in response, respectively, to a 1 percent in-
crease in real GDP and a 1 percent decline in the nominal interest
rate. The semi-elasticity measures the percentage increase in real
money induced by a decline in the interest rate of 100 basis points.
3In a shopping time model, there is a transactions technology re-
lating the volume of transactions to time and money used in per-
forming those transactions.
4The relatively low income elasticity is indistinguishable from a
time trend in money demand.
5The NOWs were first introduced in Massachusetts and New
Hampshire in 1972, then Connecticut, Maine, Rhode Island, and
Vermont in 1976, followed by New York in 1978. See Laporte (1979).
6Business customers have several ways to minimize the loss of
interest on demand deposits. One way is the sweep programs de-
veloped during the 1960s and 1970s that allow business demand
deposits to be swept overnight into interest-bearing accounts such
as repurchase agreements and money market mutual funds.
7The term checking account is used to mean demand deposits and
other checkable accounts, such as NOW accounts, classified in
M1. Checkable savings accounts are accounts classified in M2
that have checking privileges.
8The Federal Reserve Board makes monthly estimates available
on the nationwide change in NOW accounts attributable to the
implementation of sweeps during the month. These are not the
current amounts being swept, and no data are available regarding
the aggregate volume of deposits currently affected by sweep
programs. Depositories do not report to the Federal Reserve the
size of their sweep programs.
9The MZM data and the data on the rate of return on MZM are
provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
10Our results are consistent with those of Carlson et al. (2000),
who find a stable cointegrating relationship between real MZM,
an opportunity cost measure, and a measure of economic activity,
using data for the period 1976-98. The income elasticity is not
different from one.
11Elastic currency is the wording used in the 1913 Federal Re-
serve Act that established the Federal Reserve System.60 1Q/2005, Economic Perspectives
APPENDIX 1: MONETARY MODEL
Here, we consider a simple transaction technology
monetary model and derive an equilibrium relationship
between real money, the opportunity cost of money, and
output that holds exactly. That stable relationship justi-
fies on theoretical grounds the stability of the empirical
money demand equation estimated in this article.
The economy consists of an infinitely lived repre-
sentative household/firm and a government. Production
uses labor according to the linear technology
Yt = Atnt,
where Yt is output and nt is time used for production. At
is a stochastic technological parameter realized in the
beginning of period t. The history of these shocks up to
period t (or state at t) is denoted by At. The initial real-
ization A0 is given.
Households have preferences over consumption ct
















where β  is a discount factor.















where Mt is money balances, Pt is the price of the good
in units of money, and st is the time used for transac-
tions. The technology parameter is the same for the two
technologies, production of the good, and transactions.
The total amount of time used for transactions and
for the production of the good is normalized to one.
st + nt = 1.
The government issues money 
S
t M  and makes
transfers to the households Tt.
In the beginning of period t, households enter an
assets market where they purchase money balances Mt
that pay net interest 
m
t i  in the following period, as well
as nominal bonds Bt that pay interest it and Zt+1 units of
state-contingent nominal securities, with price zt+1, nor-
malized by the probability of occurrence of state At+1, in
units of currency at t that pay one unit of money at the
beginning of period t+1 in a particular state At+1. Subse-
quently, they enter a goods market where they purchase
consumption with Mt, according to the transaction tech-
nology in equation 4. They also receive total income
PtAt(1–st), as well as nominal transfers, net of taxes, Tt.
The period by period budget constraints are
() ()
()
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A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices
and quantities such that a) households choose
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+ =  to maximize utility in equation 3
subject to the restrictions in equations 4 and 5 together
with a no-Ponzi games condition on the
holdings of assets, given {} {} 1 0 0 ,, , , a n d ;
m
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b) the government satisfies  () 11 1
Sm S
tt t t M iM T −− =+ +  ;
and c) markets clear, so that
6) Bt = 0,
7) Zt+1 = 0,
8) ,
s
tt M M =
9) ct = At(1 – st).
We could derive a money demand equation using
the first order conditions of the households’ problem.
That equation, however, would be a function of all the
prices, including the prices on the state contingent
nominal debt, as well as unobservable shocks, and,
therefore, could not be directly estimated using simple
econometric methods. Instead, the first order conditions
can be used to derive the following relationship





















− −ν  α= ξ  ν 
 As pointed out by Lucas (1988),
this equation is not exactly a money demand, rather it is
an equilibrium relationship between real money, con-
sumption, and the opportunity cost of holding money
that holds exactly in this stochastic environment. Given61 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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that in this simple model consumption coincides with










with interest elasticity equal to the Cobb–Douglas
transactions technology parameter ν .1 Note that the de-
rived income elasticity is one.
The assumptions on the homogeneity of the trans-
action technology and technology progress in the two
sectors, as well as assumptions on the utility function,
imply that the long-run income elasticity is one. Alter-
native assumptions could imply a trend in money de-
mand. Empirically, this could be captured by a time
trend or by an income elasticity different from one, as
in Ball (2001). Instead, we argue that the evidence is
consistent with a stable long-run money demand with a
unitary income elasticity and no time trend, if the mon-
etary aggregate is appropriately defined to capture the
technological and regulatory innovations since 1980.
1Lucas (2000) reports the interest elasticity to be ν  = 0.5. He justifies this result by arguing that equation 10 with
ν  = ½ is an approximation to the equilibrium relationship when the transaction technology is Baumol–Tobin. In fact,
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APPENDIX 2: DATA USED IN FIGURES AND REGRESSIONS
The following is a list of data used in the figures and regressions for this article. Unless explicitly specified, all
monetary aggregates are in billion of dollars and are not seasonally adjusted annual data (we take the December
value of each year as the entire year’s value).1
M1
1900–14: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960, Series X-267).
1915–58: Friedman and Schwartz (1971, pp.708–722, table A1, column 7).
1959–2003: Federal Reserve Board, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt.
M2
Federal Reserve Board, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt.
M3
Federal Reserve Board, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist1.txt.
MZM
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED database, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/MZMNS.txt.
Other checkable deposits (quarterly frequency)
FRB data available through Haver Analytics (FMOTN in USECON).
MMMFs (quarterly frequency)
FRB data available through Haver Analytics (FMGMN in USECON).
Institutional money market mutual funds (quarterly frequency)
FRB data available through Haver Analytics (FMIOMN in USECON).
Transaction deposits swept into MMDAs (Cumulative)
FRB data available through Haver Analytics (FMSWEEP in USECON).
Demand deposits
FRB data available through Haver Analytics (FMDN in USECON).
Price deflator
1900–28 (1929 = 100): U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960, Series F-5).
1929–2003 (2000 = 100): BEA data available through Haver Analytics (DAGDP in USECON or USNA).2
Real GDP
1900–28 (millions of 1929 dollars), Kendrick (1961, Table A-III).
1929–2003 (in chained 2000 dollars), BEA data available through Haver Analytics (GDPHA in USECON or USNA).3
Nominal interest rate
1900–69: Friedman and Schwartz (1982, table 4.8, column 6), defined as short-term commercial paper rate.
1970–2003: three-month commercial paper, FRB data available through Haver Analytics, FFP3 in USECON.
Opportunity cost
1900–79: M1’s opportunity cost is defined as the nominal interest rate for this period.
1980–2003: MZM’s opportunity cost = three-month T-bill rate (Secondary Market) – MZM own rate.
Three-month T-bill rate: FRB data available through Haver Analytics (FTBS3 in USECON).
MZM own rate: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED database, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/
MZMOWN.txt.
1We follow Lucas (2000).
2These two series overlap in 1929 and using the ratio of the two series’ values in 1929, we construct a new price deflator
that goes from 1900 to 2003, with 2000 = 1.0.
3From these two series, we construct a new real GDP in 2000 dollars using the new price deflator (2000 = 1.0).63 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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